I am a Ph.D. candidate in Politics at Princeton University. I am on the job market for the 2024-2025 school year.

I’m a formal political theorist interested in democratic institutions with a focus on accountability in both electoral and bureaucratic settings.

Click here to view my CV or here to email me.

The news media's role in holding politicians accountable is instrumental to representative democracy. Yet, politicians often claim that media organizations are biased against them. I develop a formal model in order to understand how politicians communicate regarding media bias, how media and voters respond to these messages, and evaluate the consequences of politician communication for democratic accountability. While all politicians point out adversarial media, low quality politicians are tempted to self-servingly criticize unbiased media as a tactic to skirt accountability. In so doing, they turn unbiased media against them, thus disallowing informative cheap-talk reporting. Voters ignore reporting, but rationally lower their evaluations of politicians who criticize media and punish them electorally. The model extensions show that politicians couple dishonest media criticism with harmful hidden actions and adverse pandering. Overall, politician communication improves the electorate's ability to select high quality representatives, but can worsen or improve politician behavior and voter welfare.


Job Market Paper

Other Papers and Works in Progress

Dynamic Political Investigations: Obstruction and the Optimal Timing of Accusations (joint with Alice Gindin)

Communicating Through and Learning from Falsifiable Information

Will the End of Chevron Improve Congressional Accountability?

Persistent Motivated Reasoning (joint with Alice Gindin)